Introduction
In our increasingly knowledge-intensive and dynamic economies management consultancies have gained strong economic and social influence as the new "market protagonists" (1986; 2002b) ). The largest consultancies rival multinational corporations in turnover and employment (Empson, 2007b; Greenwood, Suddaby, & McDougald, 2006) and serve clients in business, politics, and nonprofit sectors (Niejahr & Bittner, 2004) . As exemplars of knowledge-intensive firms (e.g., Armbrüster, 2006; Empson, 2001; Morris, 2001 ) consultancies provide external expert knowledge to clients who may be, at least temporarily, struggling to keep up with current trends and achieve business success (McKenna, 2006) . The constant stream of innovations that management consultancies produce serves their clients, but also positions the consultancies as thought leaders, thus creating continued demand for their advice (Ernst & Kieser, 2002b, c; Fincham & Clark, 2002) . (Abrahamson, 1996; Benders & van Veen, 2001 ; Kieser, 1997; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001) suggest that management consultancies strategically criticize concepts to reshape the market for management knowledge and establish their own innovations as sources of commercial success. This self-marketing seeks to orient management discourse in a direction that legitimizes specific products and processes as rational and effective (Berglund & Werr, 2000) . In this view, the rise of management consulting is not merely a product of economic needs. It results at least in part from the consultancy firms' rhetorical strategies to shape management discourse, develop a reputation as thought leaders, and establish their concepts as appropriate remedies for a range of management problems.
Studies of management fashions
The centrality of market discourse, reputation, and perceived legitimacy in the marketing of consulting services suggests that their competitive success largely feeds on the institutional capital (Oliver, 1997) held individually by different consultancies as well as collectively by the industry as a whole. Oliver (1997, 709) defines institutional capital "as the firm's capability to support value-enhancing assets and competencies" through the "effective management of the firm's resource decision context". In this sense, an organization's institutional capital increases in proportion to its embeddedness in, and active management of, its institutional context facilitating the acquisition, creation, and improvement of superior resources. Such institutionally contingent resources may include legitimacy, reputation, or the client relationships that, in turn, underpin the competitive advantage of consultancies. Hence, the strategies for managing the institutional context so as to create or sustain institutional capital are vital to consultancy firms' success.
Since the 1990s, institutional theorists have developed some understanding of how organizations can act strategically within their institutional environments (Oliver, 1991b) or transform them altogether (DiMaggio, 1988b; Lawrence, 1999; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004) . Studies on "institutional entrepreneurship" (DiMaggio, 1988b; have begun to uncover how actors become both motivated and enabled to manipulate the very institutional structures that they inhabit. 1 The innovative activity of management consultancies has recently been identified as a form of institutional entrepreneurship (Walgenbach, 2002) . Some studies focus on the role of management consultancies as fashion setters who actively create isomorphic pressures in their client industries (Kieser, 1997; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001) . Others investigate the use of rationality myths in the service delivery processes (Armbrüster, 2004; Bäcklund & Werr, 2001; Berglund & Werr, 2000) or analyze different sociocultural and historical influences on the emergence of the consultancy industry (Faust, 2002b; Kipping, 2002; Kipping & Armbrüster, 2002) . Nonetheless, there are very few explicit analyses of the strategies by which consultancy firms may manipulate the institutional ramifications of their own existence and operation.
To address this shortcoming, we examine and classify the strategies by which management consultancies can create or sustain their institutional capital. Drawing on strategic approaches to institutions (Bresser & Millonig, 2003; Lawrence, 1999; Oliver, 1991b) , and illustrative evidence from the German consulting market, we identify a set of five interrelated strategies by which consultancies can manipulate their external environment and enhance their competitiveness on the level of the industry, the strategic group, and the individual firm.
Based on recent discussions by institutionalists addressing embedded and widely distributed (Quack, 2007) agency, we specify the enabling conditions and specific nature of these strategies. Hence, we enable a better understanding of the strategic repertoire of management consultancies. We also advance institutional theory by demonstrating how institutional change is the collective and emergent product of distributed actors' localized efforts to enhance their individual competitive position.
The remainder of the paper is organized in three parts: In Section 2 we introduce the theoretical orientation of the paper. We outline the foundations and recent debates in institutional theory and present a repertoire of generic strategies for manipulating institutional envi-1 For a review of a see Garud et al. (2007) and Hardy et al. (2008) .
ronments. In Section 3 we describe the institutional properties of the management consultancy field and, using illustrative evidence from the German consulting market, explore how consultancies can create and sustain their individual and collective institutional capital. In Section 4 we develop a classification of consulting-specific institutional strategies, and discuss their emergent and distributed nature and the implications for future research.
Theoretical Orientation

Foundations of institutional theory
In the broadest sense, institutions represent a collective consensus that characterizes a social situation. Institutions define the categories and relationships of actors who are usually expected to be involved and specify the types of ideas and behaviours that are considered acceptable in that situation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983a; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; . For business organizations, the institutionalist argument means that they compete for "social as well as economic fitness" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983a, 150) , because their survival and success depend not only on the technical efficiency, but also the perceived social appropriateness, of their ideas, products, structures, and practices. Legitimacy becomes a critical resource that organizations must extract from their institutional environment.
Studies such as those by Powell, 1983a), Scott ((Scott, 1991) , and Scott and Meyer conceptualize the relevant institutional environment in which legitimacy is conferred as an organizational field that represents a midlevel social sphere. In this sphere, those stakeholders that "in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 149) evaluate the legitimacy of one anothers' actions and connect concrete organizational action with broader normative and social structures. Fields progress from an "emerging" to a "mature" state as their constituents interact more frequently and develop shared meaning systems. Emerging fields are still relatively underorganized domains. They revolve around a central "issue" such as recycling (Hoffman, 1999) , HIV/AIDS treatment (Maguire et al., 2004) , or new technologies (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002) , but their members only interact sporadically and unsystematically. Members may recognize some degree of mutual interest, but they lack institutional roles with widely shared, clear-cut norms against which to evaluate their actions. In contrast, mature fields, such as healthcare (e.g., Brock, Powell, & Hinings, 1999; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000) , law (e.g. Empson, 2007a; Hoffman, 1999) or accounting (e.g. Greenwood, Hinings, & Suddaby, 2002; are characterized by an established regulatory framework and common meaning system. In these fields, constituents are aware of their common enterprise and stratified into clear structures of interorganizational coalition and domination (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983a) . In mature fields, organizations are exposed to strong isomorphic pressures that force legitimacy-seeking organizations to comply with the shared rules and norms of the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983a; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) Isomorphism is the dominant concept of early institutionalism, which leads critics to remark that it fosters an overly deterministic image of institutions as reified structures to which organizations passively adapt (DiMaggio, 1988a; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Oliver, 1991a Oliver, , 1992 . These critiques lead institutionalists to shift their research interest from examining processes of isomorphic convergence to exploring the conditions and mechanisms producing divergence in organizational forms and behaviours.
Institutional Strategy and Entrepreneurship
DiMaggio's (1988b) foundational argument that "new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly" (p. 14) reoriented institutionalists' research towards participants' efforts to actively shape the sociopolitical context of their operations to their advantage. Under the label of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988b; Leca, Battilana, & Boxenbaum, 2006; Leca & Naccache, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004) , institutionalists investigate strategies by which self-interested actors try to establish "a strategically favorable set of conditions" for their organization (Lawrence, 1999, 167) . Oliver (1991b) provides a repertoire of strategic responses to existing institutional pressures, but Suchman (1995) and Lawrence (1999) suggest more proactive strategies for managing organizational legitimacy and shaping the institutional context against which organizational actions are evaluated. From this previous research, Bresser and Millonig (2003) specify five generic manipulation strategies (see table 1), which institutional entrepreneurs might use to shape the rules and norms of their institutional environment according to their own interest. Lobbyism is a close relative of co-optation. It describes organizations' attempts to mobilize external institutional actors as advocates of their own interests. However, while cooptation primarily seeks to reduce institutional pressures on a specific organization, lobbyism is a dual-focus strategy: it can be used to reduce constraints on the lobbying organization or to increase institutional pressure on its competitors (Oliver, 1991b; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) .
Membership strategies, as originally described by Lawrence (1999) , specify which organizations can legitimately exercise particular functions in a social domain. Organizations that set membership rules actively manipulate the system of social positions in their field by determining the relative ease with which their competitors can enter and access critical resources. These rules can be explicit or implicit as, for example, in the professions (Freidson, 2001) or keiretsu networks (Lincoln, Gerlach, & Takahashi, 1992) . However, regardless of their nature, membership rules exert normative pressures that organizations must observe if they are to become or remain legitimate members of an organizational field.
Standardization strategies (Lawrence, 1999) aim at establishing specific organizational practices, structures, processes, products, or services as legitimate and "normal" within an organizational field. Organizations try to portray their own organizational characteristics as appropriate for all members of the organizational field (Greenwood et al., 2002) by invoking technical, legal, regulatory, or more informal norms and standards. Establishing its own way of operating as a field-wide standard favours the standard-setting organization and enhances its institutional capital.
Influence in Suchman's (1995) sense is the furthest-reaching strategy that can be used to manipulate institutional environments. Influence extends beyond the context of the organizational field to influence norm systems at the societal level. Organizations that pursue this strategy aim to build normative and cognitive legitimacy for particular ideas and actions.
They reframe an existing social reality within which those ideas and actions that suit their organizational interests appear acceptable, even taken for granted.
However, these strategies, which are directed towards manipulating institutional arrangements at the level of the field or society, raise two important questions. First, how do organizations become motivated and enabled to act as "institutional entrepreneurs"
(DiMaggio, 1988b) and challenge those institutional rules and norms that supposedly define their interests and scope for strategic action? Second, how do organizational actors succeed in manipulating institutional arrangements that are supported by broad social consensus? These questions represent the basic puzzles of institutional theory and have attracted growing academic attention under the labels of embedded and, more recently, distributed agency.
Embedded and Distributed Agency
With growing interest in institutional change during the 1990s, the "paradox of embedded agency" (Holm, 1995, 398; Seo & Creed, 2002: 225) , the question of how institutional agents bring about change from within their field now constitutes a fundamental puzzle for institutional theorists.
The institutional entrepreneurship literature focuses primarily on dissatisfied, and therefore weakly embedded, actors as potential change agents (Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Maguire et al., 2004) . Only recently have institutionalists started to investigate how privileged, firmly embedded actors can challenge the very norms from which they benefit and supposedly take for granted (Greenwood et al., 2002; Sherer & Lee, 2002) . In their study of the Big Five accounting firms, show how elite actors can occupy socioeconomic positions that make them aware of favourable alternative institutional arrangements, are motivated to further enhance their competitive position by pursuing these alternatives, and are largely immune to institutional pressures as exerted by, for example, their professional regulators. These insights constitute an important step towards disentangling the "paradox of embedded agency", because they
show how the perceived underperformance and awareness of preferable arrangements motivate, and perceived immunity from institutional sanctions enable, organizations to challenge supposedly taken-for-granted institutions.
At the same time, this stream of work begins to show that institutional change may be more collective than the imagery of institutional entrepreneurship may previously have suggested. focus on the interplay of an elite group of firms and their regulator, but Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) highlight the relevance of an even wider array of actors in field-wide practice innovation. These authors argue that institutional change may emerge from multiple, distributed actors engaging in parallel, but uncoordinated activities that may result in profound field-level change. This perspective might more realistically describe how institutional strategies play out, and how organizations can enhance or maintain their institutional capital.
The Organizational Field of Management Consultancy
Management knowledge is the central "issue" around which the consulting field revolves (Engwall & Kipping, 2002; Faust, 2002a; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001 ). The creation, dissemination, and application of new management concepts connects its members into a collective endeavor that makes them "interact more frequently and fatefully" (Scott, 1994, 208) with each other than with actors outside their "knowledge arena" (Engwall & Kipping, 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001) . Actors who have a stake in the management consultancy field include consultancies, their current and potential employees, clients in various for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, academic institutions, professional associations, and the media. Consultants, "management gurus", and mass media are recognized as a "fashion-setting community" that coalesces around the "dramatization of newness" (Faust, 2002a, 146) and forms the core of a "recognized area of institutional life" in the sense of DiMaggio and Powell's (1983, 148) field concept.
Authors describe the management consultancy field in terms that emphasize both the emerging and the mature properties. Kipping and Armbrüster (1999) highlight that the relatively imprecise nature of the consultancy concept, the multitude of specializations, and the frequent change of products and producers complicate the definition of field boundaries. Unlike other professional business services such as law or accounting, management consulting is not a protected occupation that requires professional certification and accreditation (Armbrüster, 2006; Groß & Kieser, 2006; Kipping & Armbrüster, 1999) . Industry associations do exist, but they play a largely supporting and representative role, contrasting greatly with the formally approved professional associations that regulate the practice of lawyers, accountants, and physicians. Industry associations provide opportunities for training and exchange, and they help small management consultancies to build credibility and reputation (Clark, 1995; Groß & Kieser, 2006) . Hence, the isomorphic pressures commonly exerted by professional associations or the state are weak in the consultancy field (Armbrüster, 2006; Groß & Kieser, 2006) . In this sense, the management consulting field is still emerging, still providing space for residual institutional ambiguity and allowing competing ideas of appropriate consulting practice to coexist.
However, the perceived status of consultancy services and the way in which field constituents interact with and perceive each other show signs of increasing field maturity. Although management consulting is still a relatively young industry, it has positioned itself as "the world's newest profession" (McKenna, 2006) , attaining quasi-professional status based on the knowledge intensity of its services (Brint, 1993; Groß & Kieser, 2006; Maister, 1993) .
This perceived professionalization of consultancy services, together with the close correlation of professionalization and institutionalization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983a) , suggests that the field has progressed towards fuller institutionalization. Its large growth rates during the 1990s "were being added to a mature frame, not an adolescent skeleton" (McKenna, 2006, 251) .
Another indicator of field maturity is the stratification of elites and non-elites, also known as central and peripheral field participants, which differ in both scale and reputation . Similar to the more traditional law (Empson, 2007a) and accounting professions , the consulting field is clearly stratified along these dimensions, distinguishing a small group of elite organizations from their peripheral competitors in both the global and German contexts. The Boston Consulting Group. Most of those firms entered the European market in the con-sulting boom of the "golden sixties" (Kipping, 1999, 209) and established the significant presence they still enjoy today.
Hence, while the boundaries of the management consultancy field are relatively fuzzy, its center is very clear. The stratification of elite and non-elite organizations, combined with the fluidity of field participation, the absence of strong isomorphic pressures, and the resultant institutional ambiguity suggest that management consulting is best described as a maturing field. Management consultancy is caught in limbo between early emergence and full structuration. This trait suggests that the processes of institutionalization are ongoing, but that there is still considerable scope for entrepreneurs to shape maturing arrangements in ways that enhance their institutional capital.
Even more than in an emerging field, in a maturing field organizations may find particularly motivating and enabling conditions for strategic action. The lack of institutions of professionalism (Armbrüster, 2006; Groß & Kieser, 2006) creates institutional ambiguity, and therefore weaker institutional constraints. Additionally, local or global elites can use their reputations and resourcefulness to shape maturing institutional structures to their advantage.
The elites' exposure to top clients and multiple industries also helps them influence institutional arrangements and give direction to their institutional strategies. These institutional and organizational conditions act as an enabler of strategic action, while the prospect of increased competitive advantage and economic reward acts as a motivator. Given that institutional arrangements privilege the interests of their promoters, individual consultancies are motivated to promote rules and structures that enhance their institutional capital and competitive advantage. These specific institutional conditions suggest that the management consultancy field is a particularly rich setting in which to explore strategies for creating and sustaining institutional capital.
Creating and sustaining institutional capital in the management consulting field
Drawing on generic strategies (see table 1 ) by which self-interested actors may impose institutional constraints on other field participants (Lawrence, 1999) or relax their own (Oliver, 1991b) , we analyze how consulting firms in Germany manipulate their institutional context to enhance their institutional capital.
Co-optation and Lobbyism
The customization of consultancy services (Fosstenløkken, Løwendahl, & Revang, 2003) and the role of networked reputation in acquiring client projects (Glückler & Armbrüster, 2003) mean that personal relationships play a strong role in selling consultancy services. Marketing measures are often personalized and aimed at forming networks with decision-makers in client organizations (Armbrüster & Barchewitz, 2004) . Thus, the consultancy field is highly susceptible to personalized institutional strategies such as co-optation and lobbyism (see Oliver, 1991b) . In this specific case, co-optation may take one of two forms, depending on whether a stakeholder is imported into the consultancy or exported to co-opt an external stakeholder "from within".
Because of the relationship-driven nature of their service, management consultancies focus on incorporating employees with existing personal networks into their own business.
This incorporation is exercised through lateral hires, the hiring of experienced professionals from competitors (Kaiser, 2004; Ringlstetter & Bürger, 2004) . Especially when firms move into new areas of practice, experienced professionals that bring their personal networks of colleagues and clients may provide a crucial boost for business development (Malos & Campion, 1995) .
A derivative of co-option that is specific to consultancies and other professional service firms is known as outplacement (Maister, 1993) , which does not rely on integrating important institutional decision-makers into the organization, but on placing loyal employees in client organizations or regulatory agencies. For many consulting firms with an "up-or-out" tournament promotion system (Galanter & Palay, 1991; Gilson & Mnookin, 1989) outplacement has become an institutionalized solution to infusing the organization with new ideas, but it has "also created a network of former employees who served as ambassadors … within other organizations that might otherwise have been wary of employing consultants" (McKenna, 2006, 208) . The prevalence of the outplacement strategy as an instrument for reinforcing consultant-client ties is illustrated by a survey of the professional backgrounds of the DAX-30 board members (see table 2) 3 . (Lixenfeld, 2008; Student, 2008) . Although the survey of DAX-30 companies is indicative, the alumni networks of large consultancies reach much further. McKinsey's German alumni network comprises approximately 1,800 managers (Reischauer, 2005, 86) compared to about 1,000 former BCG consultants (Student, 2006, 32) .
The prospect of outplacement to prestigious client firms increases the attractiveness on the graduate labor market (Reischauer, 2005; Student, 2006) . It creates institutional capital in that it helps attract new talent from leading business schools and fuels the constant stream of new entrants that is needed to sustain the up-or-out promotion system. Additionally, consultants that have successfully been outplaced with clients can help their former employer secure a steady stream of new projects, based on good personal relationships and information advantages (Bresser & Millonig, 2003; McKenna, 2006, 203-210) . However, the benefit of these client-consultant ties is mutual as clients can also benefit from employing former consultants.
Their inside knowledge of their former firm makes it possible for them to manage service delivery more effectively and to raise performance expectations (see Van den Bosch, Baaij, & Volberda, 2005) . For instance, former consultants in client organizations may have maintained good personal relationships with partners in the consultancy through whom they can sanction low-performing consulting work.
Within New Public Management initiatives, management consultancies are increasingly seconding members to government and policy-making committees (Bill & Falk, 2006; Faust, 1998 (Falk, Rehfeld, Römmele, & Thunert, 2006, 292) .
However, these efforts to build institutional capital also had unintended consequences that reduced it. As new stakeholders surfaced, government watchdogs began to scrutinize the government use of management consultancies; journalists and academics publicly questioned its legitimacy. The increasing influence of management consultants on political decisionmaking is now met with great skepticism as critics observe the emergence of a "republic of consultants" (Leif, 2006; Niejahr & Bittner, 2004) in which political decision-makers depend increasingly on external consulting expertise. Following a resolution of the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag, the Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof) developed guidelines for government relations with, and the use of, management consultants (Bundesrechnungshof, 2006) . Hence, when some elements of the institutional environment, but not others, are co-opted to align with organizational interests, unintended consequences for firms' institutional capital can occur.
This means that the deliberate competitive or institutional strategies of individual firms may entail both positive and negative unintended consequences that drive the developing process of institutional change. Deliberate and emergent, and competitive and institutional components of strategy influence each other through feedback loops. For instance, the deliberate outplacement of qualified consultants in client organizations solves the incentive problems of an up-or-out career system, but also creates an emerging pattern of organizational actions that may institutionalize the use of consultancies by clients. Similarly, consultants' work on policy committees generates fee income and, at the same time, creates the incidental by-product that political consulting becomes increasingly indispensable and eventually taken for granted in the public sphere.
Membership
Membership strategies specify which organizations can legitimately exercise particular functions and thus derive benefits resulting from their activity. Nevertheless, in addition to Lawrence's (1999) original conceptualization of membership strategies, we also find distinct non-membership strategies among German management consultancies.
Small and medium-sized consultancies pursue a membership strategy in Lawrence's (1999) sense, in that they organize themselves in industry associations such as the Bundesverband Deutscher Unternehmensberater (BDU) or the RKW Beratungsnetzwerk. These associations, which serve as substitutes for established professional associations with regulatory functions, signal a minimum of consultancy competence and quality to potential clients (Groß & Kieser, 2006) .
By contrast, for leading international consultancies such membership strategies are counterproductive. In the absence of a protected occupational title and formal professional accreditation, reputation serves as a proxy for quality. Hence, elite firms can use their reputation as a "membership criterion" and form a strategic group (McGee & Thomas, 1986 ) of management consultancies defined by elite status (Ferguson, Deephouse, & Ferguson, 2000) .
Their rigorous, strict demands serve to maintain the exclusivity of their circle and to establish a company-specific "micro-profession", which is reinforced by in-house monitoring of quasiprofessional principles (McKenna, 2006) 5 . This legitimation-qua-reputation gives elite consultancies access to knowledge and policy-making arenas in which best practices are created, validated, or diffused (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001) .
By steering clear of more inclusive industry associations, elite firms avoid reputational contamination and external institutional influence. In this sense, they pursue a nonmembership, or exclusivity, strategy to enhance their individual institutional capital and weaken that of their smaller competitors.
Standardization
Standardization strategies define what is to be seen as normal, for example, for a particular service. In this respect, membership and standardization strategies are interdependent, since both promote and eventually institutionalize consistent standards of professional practice and service quality. Those consultancies that promote a standard -and which most likely already comply with it -automatically gain legitimacy advantages and enhance their institutional capital.
For instance, in an attempt to strengthen the collective reputation and legitimacy of the consulting profession, the BDU filed a request to the Ministry of Economics to protect the title Unternehmensberater (management consultant) under occupational law. According to the proposal, the title Unternehmensberater should have been awarded conditional upon specific credentials, such as academic training or practical experience. But in December 1997, the proposal was rejected by the ministry (Glückler & Armbrüster, 2003, 272; Groß & Kieser, 2006; Handelsblatt, 1997) .
In accord with their non-membership strategy, elite consultancy firms with a strong position in their particular fields can use more subtle standardization strategies to enhance their individual, rather than the collective, institutional capital. These consultancies can raise to the status of an institution those practices, procedures, and products in which they have competitive advantages. In this context, the creation of management fashions constitutes a standardization strategy. It at least temporarily institutionalizes concepts or practices by ascribing to them a value over and above their technical merit (Lawrence, 1999) . Although fashions are transitory rationality myths and only weakly institutionalized, nevertheless, while they last they are regarded as standards in their respective areas for the duration of their lifecycle. Their technical merit is not evaluated strictly by goal attainment, because their application confers benefits of perceived conformity with super-ordinate norms of rationality and progress (Benders & van Veen, 2001; Kieser, 1997; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001 ).
Consultancies as "expert theorizers" (Strang & Meyer, 1993, 498) occupy privileged positions in "reality-defining arenas" (Seo & Creed, 2002, 242) where the legitimacy of competing management innovations is constructed and contested. Within these arenas, their status enhances the impact and "positive normative emulation" of their ideas (Suchman, 1995, 579) .
Thus, management fashions become important standardization devices of socially constructed business solutions. A consultancy that successfully establishes its own concepts or procedures as temporary standards enhances its own institutional capital, because it develops market pre-ferences that constrain its competitors, which are forced to adapt and subscribe to concepts or procedures in which they are at a technical disadvantage. Further, as the use of specific consulting services becomes a more standardized response to certain management problems, the standardization efforts of individual firms can build collective institutional capital for the entire industry.
Influence
Generally, the successful marketing of consultancy services depends on a positive perception of the engagement of consultants in the target industry. The strategic influence on such a fundamental attitude can endow consultancy services with normative, and eventually cognitive, legitimacy (Suchman ((1995) ; (Røvik, 2002) .
There is clear evidence that in the past consultancy firms have successfully influenced the value systems not only of their clients, but also of society at large, so that the support services they provide to management teams and policy makers have become taken for granted (Falk et al., 2006; Faust, 1998; McKenna, 2006; Wimmer, 1992) . These observations resonate strongly with Meyer and Rowan's (1977) argument that the modernization of society makes more areas of society accessible to the rules of rationality. Management consultancies have been able to use and propel this trend by reaching out to new groups of potential clients and applying their expertise to new types of problems which traditionally had not been open to their services (Ernst & Kieser, 2002c; Rudolph, 2004) .
Influencing strategies may involve other strategies of institutional manipulation. such as outplacement and secondment strategies. However, these strategies may be more wideranging, especially in areas where firms try to influence societal value systems more generally and open up new markets.
In the business sector, consulting firms can rely on their "systems of persuasion" (Alvesson, 1993 (Alvesson, , 1011 to create institutionalized myths that buffer their existence and operation from questioning. Based on a study of self-presentations by various global management consultancies on the Internet, Bäcklund and Werr (2001) conclude that management consultancies use prevalent social myths of rationality, globalization, and universality to institutionalize their services as necessary components of successful management.
To influence value systems outside their traditional "management" domain, consultancies can employ secondment strategies to demonstrate their value for political decisionmaking. Active engagement in social and environmental issues has also become an important mission for a large number of businesses that put corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship high on their agenda. Management consultancies can work "pro bono" to display their social responsibility, i.e., deliver services for projects of social relevance free of charge (e.g., BCG, 2008; McKinsey, 2008b; Roland-Berger, 2008a) . However, these initiatives also provide a strong platform for more wide-ranging societal strategies.
From the institutionalist perspective, pro bono work not only builds reputation as a socially responsible organization, more importantly, it also creates impressions of ubiquity that may be perceived as an indicator of acceptance and legitimacy. Pro bono work gives consultancy firms a legitimate presence in social domains that were previously not accessible to them due to incompatible value systems. Especially the large, elite consultancies have developed their status as the new "reflective elite" (Deutschmann, 1993; Faust, 2002a) or the "supra-experts" (Ernst & Kieser, 2002a) by applying their expertise pro bono to societal problems as diverse as climate protection (McKinsey, 2007) , restructuring the church (see Hardt, 2004; Neidhart, 1997) , national innovation systems (BCG, 2006) , and city attractiveness (Roland-Berger, 2008b) . These initiatives counter negative public perceptions of consultants as hyper-rational cost-cutters. They build a legitimate basis of activity for consultancies in a wide range of societal sectors and thereby develop the consultancies' individual and collective institutional capital. Consultancies' individual efforts to manage their reputation collectively drive the institutionalization of management consultancy throughout society.
However, we note that the influencing strategy should not be considered in isolation from other, super-ordinate institutional arrangements. For instance, from a historical perspective, it is clear that the influence of management consultancies in societies with traditional values of status, prestige, and authority is lower than in meritocratic societies, which stress functional values of effectiveness and efficiency (Faust, 2002b 
Discussion and Conclusion
Unlike the "classic" professions such as accountancy or law, management consultancy is distinguished by institutional ambiguity and weakly entrenched, relatively localized "protoinstitutions" (Lawrence et al., 2002) . Thus, consultancies have an advantageous position in that restrictive institutional pressures are relatively weak, while the relative maturity and stratification of the field has produced a central elite, which enjoys an entrepreneurial freedom to influence emerging institutions by virtue of their size and reputation. Drawing on discussions of institutional capital (Oliver, 1997) and its strategic manipulation (Bresser and Millonig, 2003; Lawrence, 1999; Oliver, 1991) we have established and examined five strategies by which management consultancies can manipulate their institutional environment in ways that help them extract competitive resources. Table 3 summarizes these strategies, the practices through which they are implemented in the consultancy field, and the institutional effects they seek to generate. Hence, it is impossible to reduce changes in the societal value system, because they are, for example, necessary to open up non-profit sectors such as politics or environmentalism for consulting services, to initiatives of single organizations. As entrepreneurs challenge "widely accepted rules of the game" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, 30) sustained by broad social consensus rather than coercive authorities, they must gradually mobilize broader sets of actors.
Management consultancies can pursue this strategy by initially focusing on relevant target industries that they can later use as their advocates when trying to manipulate broader societal value systems. A target industry of this kind, such as public administration, can be addressed at first by measures focused on one client, in anticipation of far-reaching multiplier effects that can eventually lead to a sector-or society-wide shift in values.
For the development of institutional theory, our argument has several interrelated implications: First, our discussion of institutional strategies in the German management consultancy field finds that instititutional entrepreneurs take less a voluntaristic role than previous accounts have suggested. The combined presence of multiple actors, such as consulting firms, the media, clients, business schools, and industry associations, with different levels of involvement implies that agency is distributed across actors. There is typically no centralized control in the consulting field, since there is no single agency with a monopoly power position that can dictate the behaviour of other agents. Hence, collective behaviour has to be understood as the result of self-organized actors interacting with their local environment, but creating global patterns of action as a by-product. For example, the creation of management fashions cannot be understood as an individual endeavor, but as the collective achievement of non-orchestrated, widely distributed agents that resemble a social movement. This understanding of institutional change initiatives as distributed agency (Garud & Karnøe, 2003; Quack, 2007) rather than individualistic entrepreneurship sheds new light on institutional strategy formation. Second, with multiple localized actors contributing to an institutional change, the formation of institutional strategies may be better understood as an interplay of emergent and deliberate actions. As Mintzberg (1987a, b) suggests, strategies need not be deliberate; they can also emerge from incremental and wide-spread patterns of actions. Although these approaches have generally been viewed as mutually exclusive opposites, Quack (2007) finds that institution building involves both practitioners' practical problem-solving and firms' deliberate political interventions. It appears that in our accounts, institutional strategies are the result of a complex interplay between deliberate sets of actions that individual consulting firms use to enhance their competitive positions, and emerging patterns of collective actions that produce institutional change through complex feedback loops with other players in the field. For instance, by deliberately outplacing loyal consultants in client organizations, close business relations may evolve into unquestioned institutionalized work practices between the two organizations. Furthermore, a consulting firm's participation in political committees is usually a deliberate attempt to enhance revenues, but can also build firm-specific institutional capital by enhancing reputation. Beyond that, industry-specific institutional capital emerges as political consulting becomes legitimized as a new field of activity.
There is a great potential for future research along these lines in the continued development of an institutionalist theory of management consultancy. Our own contribution should be understood as a first theoretical step in this direction. Further empirical research should be pursued to analyze different strategies for building up institutional capital, to uncover differences between different strategic groups of management consultancy firms, and to identify the constituent forms of institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) that are used in specific institutional contexts.
Insights from such an empirical study would also inform institutionalist theory on maturing fields. Such a study is intrinsically interesting, because it would allow institutionalists to understand the gradual structuration of fields through a "cumulative history of action and interaction" (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, 98) . Evidently, the consultancy field provides an instrumental, abundant setting for exploring the motivations, abilities, and activities of institutional agents creating and modifying institutional arrangements. Hence, a better understanding of their strategies and the institutional conditions under which they are to be employed will help produce a better institutional theory of consultancy firms and their institutional capital, and also offer practical advice about strategies to strategically enhance and maintain it.
